Al Arabiya: It is not surprising that the United States found in Osama Bin Laden’s Pakistan house videotapes and films documenting his activities, such as the video in which he appeared in his unkempt beard watching himself of a TV monitor with passion and holding a remote control.
The United States may not find much in Bin Laden’s house except some media and cultural content. The US may have possibly found very little about Al Qaeda, its network ties, strategies and planning.
As such, it is important to re-consider the US announcement that it found a treasure throve of information about Al Qaeda.
What the United States found in Bin Laden's house in Abbottabad is very much similar to what the United States discovered following the September 11 attacks in one of Al Qaeda’s camps in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
At the time, the United States released a video showing an elderly man talking with Bin Laden and “congratulating” him for the September 11 attacks, and Bin Laden giving his opinion about the events and saying that he had not expected the towers in New York to collapse.
In that video, Bin Laden was documenting the visit of a “guest” from outside Afghanistan.
When I met Bin Laden in June 2001 in an area that was three hours from Kandahar, one of the first things he said was: “Did you follow what the media published two days ago about the content and films that Al Qaeda produced?”
I answered that I was travelling for three days and that I was not able to follow the news. His media team then brought a TV screen and a video player and he showed me some recordings of Al Qaeda military trainings, which CNN and Al Jazeera had broadcast at the time.
That was clear enough for me to notice that Bin Laden gave special attention to the media like any politician who understands the importance of the media and their ability to influence people and change the course of events.
During my meeting with him he added: “We have produced a film about Al Qaeda that is called ‘Destroying the Destroyer,’ I will give you a copy of it, you can use it in the report you will write about meeting me!”
He smiled a little and told me: “Do you know why we called it ‘Destroying the Destroyer?’”
I replied: “Yes, you mean Navy destroyer USS Cole.”
He said: “Yes, We called it ‘Destroying the Destroyer’ in response to that program aired by Al Jazeera and titled ‘Destroying Al Qaeda!’”
Bin Laden's interest in the media and in documenting his activities was known even before the September 11 attacks. He would not leave any important event or activity without documenting it.
He would even sometimes rent advanced shooting equipments from montage companies in Pakistan to record important Al Qaeda activities. Most of pre-September 11 Al Qaeda media content was recorded on VHS tapes. These include lectures by Ben Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders. It was before Al Qaeda established a visual media department, which was named “Al Sahab institute.”
Sources close to Taliban and Al Qaeda told me at the time that Bin Laden had obtained permission from Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar to use a satellite dish, which was banned in Afghanistan during the rule of Taliban. Only the media office of Mullah Omar had a satellite dish back then.
Bin Laden wanted his media office to record all important media reports and send them to his office so that he could watch them.
His media office even used to do reviews of current world affairs, newspapers, important columns in the media, and books in both English and Arabic.
Even before Al Qaeda was known as Al Qaeda it used to produce a newscast named “Al Akhbar” (The News) about the major developments in world affairs and the situation of the battlefronts against the Soviets and the communist government in Afghanistan. The newscast was produced in the late 1980s and the early 1990s and it used to be distributed on Al Qaeda offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Unlike many top wanted guerrillas, Bin Laden’s interest in the media reflected a personality that was looking for a political and leadership role bigger than the role he was doing as an Al Qaeda chief. His rigorous follow-up of events and the way he appeared in the media demonstrated that he was searching for a bigger role and was plotting a project bigger than Al Qaeda and its abilities.
After the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) aired a report, which I prepared about my visit to Bin Laden on June 23, 2001, the Al Qaeda media office called me from a phone number that appeared to be from Kabul and said: “We just now watched your report and we will call you another time.”
